We introduce a generic framework for proof carrying code, developed and mechanically verified in Isabelle/HOL. The framework defines and proves sound a verification condition generator with minimal assumptions on the underlying programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. We demonstrate its usability for prototyping proof carrying code systems by instantiating it to a simple assembly language with procedures and a safety policy for arithmetic overflow.
Introduction
Proof Carrying Code (PCC), first proposed by Necula and Lee [11] [12] , is a scheme for executing untrusted code safely. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of a PCC system. The code producer is on the left, the code receiver on the right. Both use a verification condition generator (VCG) that relies on annotations in the program to reduce the program to a logic formula. The logic used in annotations and proof is the safety logic, the property that is shown about the program is the safety policy.
It is the responsibility of the producer to generate the annotations and a proof for the formula the VCG constructs. They are then transmitted to the code receiver who again runs the VCG and uses a proof checker to verify that the proof indeed fits the formula produced by the VCG. Proof checking is much simpler and more efficient than proof searching. The framework for PCC systems we present in this paper concentrates on the safety critical receiver side. It has the following two main purposes and contributions: safety of the system and prototyping new safety logics. Proof checker, VCG, and safety logic constitute the trusted code base of the PCC system. Proof checkers are relatively small standard components of many logical frameworks. The VCG on the other hand is large (several thousand lines of C code in current PCC systems [6] [13]) and complex (it handles annotations, produces complex formulae, and contains parts of the safety policy). Our framework contains a VCG with a formal proof of safety, mechanically checked in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [16] . The VCG is not restricted to any particular machine language, safety policy, or safety logic. Additionally to the correctness of VCG and proof checker, we need the safety logic to be sound. As a recent bug [9] in the SpecialJ system [6] shows, this is not trivial. It is not even immediately clear, what exactly a safety logic must satisfy to be sound. Our framework makes the underlying assumptions on machine, policy, and logic explicit. It also makes a simple, formally clear statement what it means for a safety logic to be sound: if the formula produced by the VCG is derivable in the safety logic, the program must be safe according to the safety policy. The framework reduces the workload for showing soundness of a safety logic by giving sufficient conditions. Since the VCG is directly executable and the framework reasonably easy to instantiate, it provides a good platform for trying out, tuning, and analysing different safety policies and logics for different target platforms. Our approach is different from other work in the formal foundation of PCC by Appel et al. [1] [2] or Hamid et al. [7] in that it works with an explicit, executable, and verified VCG and not directly on the machine semantics or a type system. The focus of the framework is on aiding logical foundations of PCC as the one started by Necula and Schneck [14] and on encouraging the analysis of safety properties other than the much researched type and memory safety. Necula and Schneck [15] also present a framework for VCGs. They work with a small, trusted core VCG that can be extended by optimised plugins. We see our work as complementary to this development: the core VCG could be proven sound within our framework, the technique of using safe, optimised extensions can then be applied to that sound core. On a broader scale, our approach is related to other techniques that impose safety policies on machine code statically: Typed Assembly Language [10] , Mobile Ressource Guarantees [3] or Java Bytecode Verification [8] . There are four levels in our PCC systems. The first level, the PCC framework ( §2), provides generic features and minimal assumptions. The second level is the platform ( §3). Platform designers can provide a concrete instantiation of the framework with respect to a specific programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. The third level is the code producer who can now write and certify programs based on the instantiated framework. We show this by certifying a concrete program in §4. Finally, also in §4, we show how code receivers can check certified code within the framework. The formalization in this paper was carried out in Isabelle/HOL, so we inherit some of Isabelle's syntax. Most of the notation is familiar from functional programming and standard mathematics, we only mention a few peculiarities. Consing an element x to a list xs is written as x#xs. Infix @ is the append operator, and xs ! n selects the n-th element from the list xs. The type T1 ⇒ T2 is the space of total functions from T1 to T2, and we frequently use the polymorphic option type datatype a option = None | Some a to simulate partiality in HOL, a logic of total functions: None stands for an undefined value, Some x for a defined value x.
Framework Definition
The components of a PCC system shown in Fig. 1 depend on three factors: programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. The programming language defines syntax and semantics for programs, the safety policy specifies the safety conditions programs must satisfy, and the safety logic provides a formal notation and a derivation calculus for proving these conditions. Our framework consists of skeletons and requirements for these three components and uses them to define and verify a generic VCG.
Program Semantics
Our framework expects the semantics of the underlying programming language in form of a function effS:: prog ⇒ (( pos × mem) × ( pos × mem)) set which relates runtime states of a program to their immediate successor states. States are tuples (p,m) of type pos × mem, where p denotes the current position in the control flow graph and m is the machine's memory, e.g., heap, stack and registers. Since prog, pos and mem are type variables the representation of programs, positions and memory can be instantiated as one likes.
Safety Logic
To specify and prove properties about programs we use a safety logic.
Every structure having constants for the truth values T rue and F alse , operators for conjunction and implication =⇒ , judgements for validity |= and provability of formulae can be employed as a safety logic as long as it respects the assumptions below. These assumptions only concern the semantics of the logical connectives. How formulae or their proofs look like and what they mean, is left open. This depends on how form, and |= get instantiated.
Safety Policy
Our framework expects the safety policy to be defined by means of the safety logic. We assume that for each position p in a program Π a safety formula safeF Π p expresses the conditions we want to hold whenever we reach p at runtime.
safeF:: prog ⇒ pos ⇒ form
In addition we assume that a safety logic formula initF Π characterises all states under which a program Π can be started.
initF:: prog ⇒ form
Now we can give a generic notion of safety for programs: A program is safe, if all states (p,m) it reaches from some initial state are safe. That is (p,m) satisfies the safety formula safeF Π p, which the platform dedicates to position p.
The Verification Condition Generator
The VCG is the core of our PCC framework. It takes a program Π and generates a formula vc in the safety logic. If this formula is provable, then the program is safe at runtime, i.e., isSafe Π holds. The structure of the vc is determined by the program's control flow graph, which is a directed graph. Nodes denote program positions and can be marked with annotations. Edges point to successor positions and are marked with branch conditions. Fig. 2 shows a control flow graph. It can be seen as an abstraction of the assembly program E, which compares two variables X and Y and eventually sets X to the maximum of these two. Definition The vcg constructs the verification condition out of so called inductive safety formulae isafeF Π p, which we generate individually for each position p in a program Π. We call a state (p,m) inductively safe if it satisfies the inductive safety formula for p, i.e., Π,(p,m) |= isafeF Π p. Fig. 3 defines isafeF Π p. The wellformedness constraint wf Π ensures that every loop in Π has at least one annotation; otherwise the recursion of isafeF would not terminate. When p lies outside the code domain domC Π we must never reach it at runtime. We express this formally by returning the unsatisfiable formula F alse in this case. For positions p within the code domain the inductive safety formula guarantees the safety formula safeF Π p. In addition, if there is an annotation A at p, we conjoin the safety formula with A. For example in program E from Fig. 2 , we have the annotation A 0 at p 0 . Hence, we obtain
[safeF E p 0 , A 0 ] for isafeF E p 0 . If p is not annotated, we take all successor positions p together with their branch conditions B and recursively compute the inductive safety formulae isafeF Π p . Using the wpF operator we construct a precondition wpF Π p p (isafeF Π p ). If this precondition holds for a state (p,m) with some successor (p ,m ), then isafeF Π p holds for (p ,m ). By constructing implications of the form B =⇒ (wpF Π p p (isafeF Π p )), we design the inductive safety formula isafeF Π p such that all states satisfying the branch condition B for a particular successor p also have to satisfy the precondition above. These implications are constructed for all pairs (p ,B) we get from succsF Π p. For example the positions p 1 and p 2 are not annotated in E. Below are their inductive safety formulae, where safeF, wpF, branch conditions and annotations are not expanded.
Executing a program Π with an inductively safe state (p,m) produces a trace of inductively safe states until we reach an annotated position p . The state (p ,m ) under which we reach this position, is safe and satisfies the annotation. After this state the execution could become unsafe. However, this does not happen if all successor states of (p ,m ) are again inductively safe. This observation guides the construction of the verification condition vcg Π, which we show in Fig. 4 . The verification condition vcg Π demands two things: First, all initial states must satisfy the first inductive safety formula isafeF Π (ipc Π). Second, for every annotated position p a the inductive safety formula isafeF Π p a and the branch condition B for all successors p of p a must guarantee the precondition wpF Π p a p (isafeF Π p ). This ensures that the transitions out of annotated positions leads to inductively safe successor states. As discussed above, this proves the safety of Π. For example vcg E would have the following form:
The first conjunct expresses that initial states are inductively safe. Note that ipc E = p 0 . Since p 0 has two successors p 1 and p 2 , which are accessible if B 01 resp. B 02 hold, we have two further conjuncts. One requires us to show that all states satisfying the inductive safety formula for p 0 and the branch condition B 01 can only have successor states that satisfy the inductive safety formula for p 1 . The other is analogous for p 2 . Soundness The VCG is sound if for every well formed program Π a provable verification condition Π vcg Π guarantees program safety, i.e., isSafe Π.
We have proven this theorem in Isabelle based on the requirements our PCC framework has on its parameter functions. In these assumptions, which we discuss in detail in the appendix, we require that succsF approximates the control flow, that wpF yields proper preconditions and that the safety logic is correct.
Framework Instantiation
In this section we instantiate the framework with a simple assembly language (SAL). We show how HOL can be instantiated as safety logic and demonstrate it on a safety policy that prohibits type errors and arithmetical overflows.
A Simple Assembly Language
SAL provides instructions for arithmetics, pointers, jumps, and procedures. We distinguish two kinds of addresses. Locations, which we model as natural numbers, identify memory cells, whereas positions identify places in a program. We denote positions as pairs (pn,i), where i is the relative position inside the procedure with name pn. To update a field x in a record r with an expression E we write r(|x:=E|), to access it we write x r. We use the environment like a history variable in Hoare Logic; it provides valuable information for annotations written as predicates on states. We can describe states by relating them to former states or refer to system resources,e.g., the length of h e is a time measure. A SAL program is a list of procedures, which consist of a name pname and a list of possibly annotated instructions. Annotations are predicates on states.
To access instructions we write cmd Π p, which gives us Some ins if Π has an instruction ins at p, or None otherwise.
SAL Semantics

SAL Instructions do the following: SET X n initialises X with NAT n. ADD X Y and SUB X Y add and subtract the values at X and Y storing the result in X. MOV X Y interprets the values of X and Y as addresses a and b; it copies the value at a to b. JMPL X Y t jumps t positions forward if the value at X is less than the value at Y;
otherwise just one. JMPB t jumps t positions backwards. CALL X pn jumps into procedure pn leaving the return address in X. RET X leaves a procedure and returns to the address expected in X. Finally, HALT stops execution. In the instantiation of effS we formalise these effects.
We do this with an auxiliary expression step Π (p,m,e), which yields Some (p ,m ,e ) if the instruction cmd Π p exists and yields the successor state (p ,m ,e ). 
(m X)⊕(m Y)],e(|h:=(h e)@(pn,i)|))
The other instructions can be handled in a similar fashion.
SAL Safety Policy
In initial states the program counter is (0,0), the main memory only contains uninitialised values and the environment e has an empty history and a copy of the initial memory on its call stack.
initF Π = λ(p,m,e). p=(0,0) ∧ ∀ X. m X=ILLEGAL ∧ h e=[] ∧ cs e=[(0,m)]
States are safe if the current instruction respects type safety and does not produce an arithmetic overflow, that is numerical results are less than MAX. Example:
For the sake of brevity we skip the remaining instructions.
SAL Safety Logic
By identifying assertions with HOL predicates, we instantiate a shallow embedded safety logic in Fig. 5 . The valididy judgment |= is directly defined by applying a predicate to a state. The argument Π is only there to be compatible with the generic signature of the framework. We define the provability judgment directly by means of the semantics. This enables us to prove verification conditions with Isabelle/HOL's inference rules using various tactics and decision procedures as tools. Alternatively we could also use a deep embedding and define with an explicit proof calculus, possibly tailored to the programming language and its safety policy. This means more effort, but could pay off in form of shorter proofs or higher degree of automation in proof search. However, this paper focuses on the framework and we rather keep the instantiation simple. According to a formula F is provable iff it holds for all states Figure 5 . Safety Logic for SAL.
in isafe Π. The inductively defined set isafe Π contains all initial states and states that originate from a computation where all states are inductively safe.
This constraint on states simplifies proofs and shortens annotations, because one can derive properties of a state from the fact that this state can be reached at runtime by only traversing inductively safe intermediate states.
Instantiating VCG helper functions
The instantiations of anF, domC and ipc are straightforward. More interesting are wpF and succsF. For the instantiation of wpF we use λ-abstraction to postpone substitution of formulae to the verification stage. Example:
We compute the effect of ADD X Y on some symbolic state (p,m,e) and demand that Q holds for the resulting state. Finally, we have a glimpse of the succsF instantiation.
Here, we chose JMPL as example:
The constraint on the program counter p=(pn,i) in the branch conditions helps to apply system invariants. These are properties that hold for all states in isafe Π irrespective of Π. For example λ((pn,i),m,e). cmd Π (pn,i) = Some (RET X) −→ (∃ k m css. cs e = (k,m )#css ∧ cmd Π (h e)!k = (CALL pn X)) is a system invariant. It says that for the call time k of the current procedure the history h e records the position of a CALL instruction.
Verifying Procedures
Procedure proofs should be modular. Code with procedure calls should only depend on these procedure's specifications (the annotations at entry and exit positions) and not on their code. For example λ(p,m,e). m X = ( m e) X ⊕ (NAT 1) might be the postcondition of a procedure that increments a location X. Here we use m e = snd (hd (cs e)) to reconstruct the memory at call time.This procedure could be called from a position where X is NAT 5. The programmer expects that after the procedure X is NAT 6 and could write this into the annotation at the return point. In the verification condition we would have to prove that this follows from the procedure's postcondition. However λ(p,m,e). m X = ( m e) X ⊕ (NAT 1) =⇒ (λ(p,m,e). m X = NAT 6) is not provable. The information that X has been NAT 5 at the procedures entry point is missing. We cannot add this information into the postcondition, otherwise we loose modularity. A way out is to pack call context dependent information into branch conditions, which succsF computes individually for each successor. If a procedure returns to (pn ,i +1) and (pn ,i ) is annotated with Ac we can construct the branch condition λ(p,m,e). Ac ( pc e, m e, e e), which claims that ( pc e, m e, e e), the state at call time, satisfies the annotation Ac. Note that pc and e, the position and environment at call time, can be defined analogously to m. Since branch conditions are added to inductive safety formulas, we now obtain a provable formula:
e). m X = NAT 6).
Call context dependent branch conditions involve some technicalities for the definition and verification of succsF. However, they fit neatly into our concept of a generic VCG. We achieve modular procedure proofs although our VCG has no notion of procedures at all.
Case Study: Overflow Detection 4.1 Motivating Example for Overflow Detection
The exemplary safety policy expressed the definition of safeF in §3.3 has two aspects: First, type safety is needed as a general property to ensure that SAL programs never get stuck. Second, the safety formula demands that the result of arithmetic operations does not exceed MAX, thus preventing overflows. Consider the following program fragment: [CALL P CHECK, ADD B C] It might be part of an application that tries to add a credit stored as a natural number in memory location C to a balance in B-for example as part of a load transaction of a smart card purse. Before executing the addition, a procedure CHECK is called to ensure that the new balance in B is less than MAX; if it does, the credit in C will be set to zero and thus the balance remains the same as before. Special care has to be taken in the implementation of CHECK:
MAX, SET H 0, ADD H B, ADD H C, JMPL H M 2, SET C 0, RET P]
M represents the maximum balance considered for the application. H should contain B + C after the second ADD statement. If the check B + C < M fails, the credit is set to zero; otherwise it is left unchanged. Even this simple example contains an implementation flaw: there could be an overflow in H. And the flaw is not merely theoretical: in the case of a silent overflow as in Java it would lead to debiting the purse instead of crediting. Inside the CHECK procedure we first set the memory location M to the maximum balance. The annotation states that location P stores the proper return address for the procedure: incA ( pc e) represents the program counter of the calling procedure incremented by one. Furthermore the annotation states that there are natural numbers in both B and C, and that all memory locations except P are the same as in the caller. The following statements require no annotations, only the exit point of the procedure RET P does: it states that all values except for those in C, M, and P are unchanged, that there are natural numbers in both B and C, and that the new value of C will be changed to zero if the new balance exceeds the maximum balance.
Annotated SAL Program
= POS (incA ( pc e)) ∧ (∃ b. m B = NAT b) ∧ (∃ c. m C = NAT c) ∧ (∀ X. X = P −→ m X = m e X)} SET M MAX, SUB M C, JMPL B M 2, SET C 0, {λ(p,m,e). (∀ X. X = C ∧ X = M ∧ X = P −→ m X = m e X) ∧ (∃ b c c . m B = NAT b ∧ m C = NAT c ∧ m e C = NAT c ∧ c = (if b + c < MAX then c else 0))} RET P ])]
Verification Condition
In Fig. 7 we show the part of the verification condition that is generated for the return from procedure CHECK. In general we get as many parts (conjuncts) as there are paths between annotated positions. That means the size of verification conditions is linear to the number of positions if all branch positions are annotated. The exam- (1,4) , B] =⇒ wpF OD (1,4) (0,2) (isafeF OD (0,2)) where B is the branch condition of succsF OD (1, 4) . Numbers 1-4 in Fig. 7 correspond to the assumption of the implication, numbers 5-6 to the conclusion. isafeF OD (1,4) results in [safeF OD (1, 4) , Ae] (compare Fig. 3 ), where safeF OD (1,4) corresponds to 1 and the annotation Ae, e.g., anF OD (1,4) = Some Ae, corresponds to 2. The branch condition B for RET P appears in 3 and 4, and consists of [λ (p,m,e). m P = POS (0,2) ∧ p= (1, 4) , λ(p,m,e). Ac ( pc e, m e, e e)] where λ(p,m,e). Ac ( pc e, m e, e e) is the annotation of the call instruction, e.g., anF OD (0,1) = Some Ac, applied to the reconstructed state at the moment of the call, and P is the memory location of the return address. This shows again how the environment e enables us to reconstruct the call state ( pc e, m e, e e) and how to transfer the information Ac of the call point to the return point. Note that this context-specific information is encoded into the branch condition B, which succsF computes individually for each successor. The annotation at the procedure's return point does not refer to a particular call point. Hence, the procedure and its verification are modular. The conclusion of the verification condition consists of the safety condition for ADD in 5 and its annotation in 6; together they form isafeF OD (0,2).
Code Producer and Consumer
The code producer can write annotated programs in Isabelle. To obtain the verification condition one can generate and execute ML code for the VCG [5] or use the simplifier to evaluate vcg Π. Proving the verification condition is supported by powerful proof tools and a rich collection of HOL theorems. For the example in Fig. 6 the simplifier and a decision procedure for presburger arithmetic suffice to prove the verification condition. For the client side Isabelle provides (compressed) proof terms and a proof checker [4] . Proofs are encoded as λ terms having a type that corresponds to the theorem they prove (Curry Howard Isomorphism). Proof Checking becomes a type checking problem, which can be handled by a small trusted program.
Conclusion
Our framework can be instantiated to various programming languages, safety policies, and safety logics. As long as the requirements of the framework are satisfied, one can directly apply our generic VCG and rely on its machine checked soundness proof. In our instantiation to SAL we show how HOL can be embedded as safety logic and how this can be used to verify the absence of arithmetic overflows. Since HOL is very expressive, formulating complex assertions or safety policies is possible. Isabelle's code generator gives us an executable version of the VCG. Using the built in tools for proof search, proof terms and proof checking we can simulate producer and client activities. Before one embarks on a particular PCC implementation, one can build a prototype in our framework and prove the soundness of the safety logic. On our web page [19] we present more complex examples and instantiations of our framework. These include programs with pointer arithmetic or recursive procedures and safety policies about time and memory consumption of programs. Moreover we have instantiated a safety logic based on first order arithmetic in form of a deep embedding [18] . There, formulae are modelled as HOL datatype and can by analysed by other HOL functions.
